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A Non-Standard Kripke Semantics
for the Minimal Deontic Logic
Abstract. In this paper we study a new operator of strong modality ⊞,
related to the non-contingency operator ∆. We then provide soundness and
completeness theorems for the minimal logic of the ⊞-operator.
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Introduction
The goal of this paper is to study a new non-normal operator of strong,
concrete, necessity that we represent as ⊞ and that we will call the box-
plus. Semantically, we interpret ⊞ϕ as saying that “ϕ is both necessary
and possible”.
This papers is also a contribution to the study of non-normal modal
logic and develops a line of work started by the study of RI-logics (Gilbert
and Venturi, 2016) and their metaphysical interpretation (Gilbert and
Venturi, 2018). In order to explain this connection we recall that in
(Gilbert and Venturi, 2017) an interesting connection was shown be-
tween the ◦-operator of RI-logics and another non-normal operator ⊡,
the boxdot operator  first defined in the context of provability logic by
Boolos (1993). Indeed, at the core of the characterization results for RI-
logics is found the so-called ⊡-translation, which uniformly replaces the
box with the boxdot: (ϕ)⊡ = ⊡ϕ⊡, where ⊡ϕ |=| ϕ∧ϕ, and therefore
forces a form of reflexivity in the modal operator.
In this paper we study an analogous form of forcing semantic prop-
erties in the basic modal operator. This time we deal with the ⊞-
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translation, which uniformly replaces the box with the boxplus:
(ϕ)⊞ = ⊞ϕ⊞, where ⊞ϕ |=| ϕ ∧ ♦ϕ.
Besides the intrinsic interest of giving characterization results for the
⊞-operator we ask whether the ⊞-translation might be useful for the
study of other non-normal operators, as the ⊡-translation showed for
the ◦-operator.
To this end it is important to remember that ◦ϕ := ϕ → ϕ, which
represents the converse of the characteristic axiom of KT. Then the con-
nection between ◦ and ⊡ can be explained by noting that both operators
express a form of reflexivity by way of the syntax. Specifically, these op-
erators capture a similar semantic property, which is expressed in the
very definition of the basic modality. While ◦ϕ cannot detect the differ-
ence between reflexive and non-reflexive frames, and therefore its mini-
mal logic is (also) determined by validity in the class of reflexive frames,
on the other hand ⊡ϕ expresses necessity in a reflexive context, since ϕ
and ϕ ∧ ϕ are equivalent in reflexive frames. It is as if these operators
were rescaling the order of the modal systems by setting the origin at the
level of reflexive frames. While the ◦-operator achieves this effect by col-
lapsing validity between K-frames and KT-frames (Gilbert and Venturi,
2016), on the other hand the ⊡-operator expresses necessity as in KT,
therefore forcing reflexivity as the basic modal property of the operator.
Coming back to the ⊞-operator, we have that ⊞ represents necessity
as in KD, since in serial frames we have that ϕ is equivalent to ϕ∧♦ϕ.
Consequently, we could enquire about the connections between ⊞ and
another non-normal operator expressing the converse of the character-
istic axiom of KD. Such an operator is well-known in the literature
(Cresswell, 1988; Fan et al., 2015; Humberstone, 1995; Montgomery and
Routley, 1966) and is meant to formalize the notion of non-contingency
as ∆ϕ := ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ. Parallel to the case of reflexivity, the ∆-operator
collapses validity between K-frames and KD-frames (Venturi and Yago,
2020), while the ⊞-operator expresses necessity as in KD, therefore forc-
ing seriality as the basic modal property of the operator.
However, there are important differences between the pair of opera-
tors which encode a form of reflexivity and those which encode seriality.
While ◦ and ⊡ are inter-definable, as is easily shown by the following
semantic equivalences: ◦ϕ∧ϕ |=| ⊡ϕ and ⊡ϕ∨ ¬ϕ |=| ◦ϕ, this is not the
case for the pair ∆ and ⊞. This seems to be a fundamental impediment
to using the characterization results for logics in the ⊞-language in order
to study logics in the ∆-language.
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We leave for another occasion a more detailed study of the rela-
tionships between ∆ and ⊞. For now, it is important to stress that
⊞ represents a strong form of necessity, able to express the semantic
property of seriality. We will show that although the boxplus is a non-
normal operator, normality will be restored from serial frames upwards.
This phenomenon suggests that the concept of normality is a relative one
and that it might depend, among other things, on the class of frames
for which a modality expresses necessity. In other words, as  expresses
the necessity of the class of all frames, ⊡ expresses that of reflexive ones,
while ⊞ that of serial ones. We think that this perspective suggests a
more general phenomenon that is partially confirmed by the results of
this paper.
Another interesting aspect worth discussing is the relation between
non-normality and expressivity. Indeed, the non-normality of ⊞ does not
prevent it to be as expressive as the normal . This observation then
seems to confirm the intuition that non-normality cannot be reduced
only to the failure of axioms and rules of the normal minimal logic K. In
other words, there seem to be also semantic constraints which constitute
non-normality.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we introduce a
syntax and semantics. In Section 2 we introduce an axiom system for the
minimal ⊞-logic, called K⊞ and we present soundness and completeness
results for this logic. We end by discussing possible extensions of the
results presented here.
1. Language and semantics
We will work with two modal languages: the language L of normal
modal logics, and the language L⊞ of ⊞-logics. They all share a countable
set Var of variables and, respectively, the sets Form and Form⊞ of
formulas which are recursively defined as usual:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ,
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ⊞ϕ.
The other boolean connectives ∨, →, ⊥ and ↔ are also defined as usual.
Moreover, in the language L as standard we put ♦ := ¬¬.
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1.1. Modal semantics
We will use a standard Kripke semantics. The novelty will be represented
by the semantic interpretation of the different modalities.
A Kripke frame is any ordered pair F = 〈W,R〉, where W is the
nonempty set of possible worlds and R ⊆ W × W is a binary relation,
called the accessibility relation. Let C be the class of all frames. A model
M based on F = 〈W,R〉 is a pair M = 〈F , V 〉, where V : Var → ℘(W )
is a valuation. The interpretation of the basic Boolean connectives is
as usual, i.e., for all p ∈ Var, ϕ, ψ ∈ Form (resp. ϕ, ψ ∈ Form⊞) and
w ∈ W we have:
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p),
M, w |= ¬ϕ iff M, w 2 ϕ,
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ.
On the other hand for the modalities we have the following interpreta-
tions. Firstly, for any ϕ ∈ Form we have:
M, w |= ϕ iff for any z ∈ W such that wRz, M, z |= ϕ.
Obviously, for ♦ (:= ¬¬) we have:
M, w |= ♦ϕ iff there is a z ∈ W such that wRz and M, z |= ϕ.
Secondly, for any ϕ ∈ Form⊞ we have:
M, w |= ⊞ϕ iff both for any z ∈ W such that wRz, M, z |= ϕ, and
there is an x ∈ W such that wRx and M, x |= ϕ.
We say that a formula is true in a model M when it is true at every
world of the frame on which M is based. While we say a formula is valid
at a frame F when it is true in every model based on F .
Notice that the connective ⊞ can be defined in the language L by
the following:
⊞ϕ := ϕ ∧ ♦ϕ.
The reverse definition is also possible, using the following formula:1
ϕ := ⊞⊤ → ⊞ϕ.
Moreover, in the class of serial frames, ϕ and ⊞ϕ are simply in-
terchangeable. We define the ⊞-translation from Form to Form⊞ that
1 We thank Lloyd Humberstone for suggesting this definition in a private com-
munication.
A non-standard Kripke semantics for . . . 129
acts by uniformly substituting all occurrences of  with ⊞ (then serial
frames cannot detect the difference between the two modalities):
(p)⊞ = p,
(¬ϕ)⊞ = ¬ϕ⊞,
(ϕ ∧ ψ)⊞ = ϕ⊞ ∧ ψ⊞,
(ϕ ∨ ψ)⊞ = ϕ⊞ ∨ ψ⊞,
(ϕ → ψ)⊞ = ϕ⊞ → ψ⊞,
(ϕ)⊞ = ⊞ϕ⊞.
By induction, we get the following:
Proposition 1.1. Given a serial frame F = 〈W,R〉 and a model M
based on F , for all ϕ ∈ Form and w ∈ W we have:
M, w |= ϕ iff M, w |= ϕ⊞.
We remark that in the formulation of the above proposition we are
slightly abusing notation, since the symbol |= stands for two different
consequence relations: one is the normal modal one, while the other
should more appropriately be presented as |=⊞ to mark that we are
evaluating formulas by the semantic clauses characteristic to the use of
the ⊞-operator or, equivalently, that we are evaluating formulas from
the language L⊞. We warn the reader that we will continue in this way
throughout the text, since we believe it will be clear from the context
which clauses should be used for the evaluation of a given formula.
A last word on the non-normality of the operator ⊞, which stems from
the invalidity of the necessitation rule. Indeed, to validate a formula like
⊞ϕ a frame needs to be serial, which is not always the case in the class
of all frames.
2. The minimal logic K⊞
In the language L⊞, we propose the following axiom system for the min-
imal ⊞-logic K⊞:
all instances of classical tautologies (Taut)
⊞(ϕ → ψ) → (⊞ϕ → ⊞ψ) (K⊞)
⊞ϕ → ¬ ⊞ ¬ϕ (D⊞)
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from ϕ and ϕ → ψ we infer ψ (MP)
from ϕ → ψ we infer ⊞ϕ → ⊞ψ (RK⊞)
By definition, we see that the logic K⊞ is a regular logic in the lan-
guage L⊞ and standardly for regular logics, from (Taut), (K⊞), (MP) and
(RK⊞) we obtain the following thesis for any n > 0:
⊞ (ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) ↔ (⊞ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ⊞ϕn) (R⊞)
It it easy to see that K⊞ is sound with respect to the class C of all
frames. Therefore, the following formula:
⊞ ϕ → ϕ (T⊞)
is not a thesis of K⊞. Hence we have K⊞ ( E2⊞, where E2⊞ is the
smallest regular logic in L⊞ containing (T⊞).
The logic K⊞ is just Lemmon’s D2 from (Lemmon, 1957), which is
the weakest system in the family of regular deontic logics. According
to Lemmon, axiom (T⊞) and the necessitation rule are undesirable for a
deontic interpretation of modality, since “we may question whether a log-
ical system interpreted deontically should contain any thesis stating that
something is a moral (or a legal) obligation” (Lemmon, 1957, p. 185).
We now prove the completeness of K⊞ by means of a canonical
model construction. The proof is inspired by a similar construction from
(Steinsvold, 2011).
We say that a set Φ of formulas is K⊞-consistent iff there is no
γ1, . . . , γn ∈ Φ such that ¬(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn) is a thesis of K
⊞. In virtue
of Lindenbaum’s Lemma, for any K⊞-consistent set Φ there is a maximal
K⊞-consistent set Γ such that Φ ⊆ Γ .
The canonical model M⊞ = 〈W⊞, R⊞, V ⊞〉 for the logic K⊞ is defined
as follows:
1. W⊞ is the set of maximal K⊞-consistent subsets of Form⊞ such that
W⊞ = W s ∪W¬s where:
• w ∈ W s iff for some ϕ ∈ Form⊞ we have ⊞ϕ ∈ w;
• w ∈ W¬s iff there is no ϕ ∈ Form⊞ such that ⊞ϕ ∈ w.
2. The relation R⊞ ⊆ W⊞ ×W⊞ is defined as follows: for all w, y ∈ W⊞
• if w ∈ W s, then wR⊞y iff λ(w) ⊆ y, where λ(w) = {ϕ | ⊞ϕ ∈ w};
• if w ∈ W¬s, then there is no y ∈ W⊞ such that wR⊞y.
3. The function V ⊞ : Var → ℘(W⊞) is defined as follows:
V ⊞(p) := {w ∈ W⊞ | p ∈ w}.
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Lemma 2.1. Let w be a maximal K⊞-consistent set of formulas such that
λ(w) 6= ∅. If λ(w) ∪ {¬ϕ} is not K⊞-consistent, then ⊞ϕ ∈ w.
Proof. Assume that w is a maximal K⊞-consistent set, λ(w) 6= ∅ and
λ(w)∪{¬ϕ} is not K⊞-consistent. Then there are γ1, . . . , γn ∈ λ(w) such
that ¬(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧ ¬ϕ) is a thesis of K
⊞; and so (γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn) → ϕ is
a thesis of K⊞. Hence, by (RK⊞), also ⊞(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn) → ⊞ϕ is a thesis
of K⊞. Hence, by (R⊞), we obtain the thesis (⊞γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ⊞γn) → ⊞ϕ.
Since w is maximal set, ⊞γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ⊞γn ∈ w; and so ⊞ϕ ∈ w.
Theorem 2.2. For the canonical model M⊞ for K⊞, any w ∈ W⊞ and
ϕ ∈ Form⊞, we have:
M⊞, w |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w.
Proof. The atomic case and the cases of Boolean connectives are stan-
dard. So we assume that ⊞ψ ∈ w. Then λ(w) 6= ∅ and, by (D⊞), also
¬ ⊞ ¬ψ ∈ w; and so ⊞¬ψ /∈ w. Hence, by Lemma 2.1, λ(w) ∪ {¬¬ψ},
thus, as well as λ(w) ∪ {ψ}, is K⊞-consistent and so, by Lindenbaum’s
Lemma, it can be extended to a maximal set z. Thus, λ(w) ⊆ z and
ψ ∈ z. Therefore M⊞, z |= ψ, by the induction hypothesis. Furthermore,
w ∈ W s, hence wR⊞z. Besides, for any y ∈ W⊞:
wR⊞y iff λ(w) ⊆ y
iff {ϕ | ⊞ϕ ∈ w} ⊆ y
iff for any ϕ, if ⊞ϕ ∈ w then ϕ ∈ y.
Hence we obtain that for any y ∈ W⊞ such that wR⊞y we have ψ ∈ y;
and so M⊞, y |= ψ, by the induction hypothesis. Thus, M⊞, w |= ⊞ψ.
Conversely, suppose that ⊞ψ /∈ w. We consider two cases: w ∈ W s;
w ∈ W¬s.
Firstly, if w ∈ W s, then λ(w) 6= ∅ and, by Lemma 2.1, λ(w) ∪ {¬ψ}
is K⊞-consistent. So, applying Lindenbaum’s Lemma, we can extend
λ(w) ∪ {¬ψ} to a maximal K⊞-consistent set y. Then λ(w) ∪ {¬ψ} ⊆ y.
So λ(w) ⊆ y and ¬ψ ∈ y. Hence wR⊞y and ψ /∈ y. So, by induction
hypothesis, we have M, y 2 ψ. Therefore, M, w 2 ⊞ψ.
Secondly, if w ∈ W¬s, then there is no y ∈ W⊞ such that wR⊞y.
Therefore, M, w 2 ⊞ψ.
Now, recall that the non-normality of the ⊞-operator is shown by
the failure of the necessitation rule, since serial frames are needed to
validate its application. For this reason, when we restrict our attention
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to serial frames we regain normality by the possibility of safely using the
necessitation rule. So, for D⊞  the logic KD in the language L⊞, which
is standardly axiomatised as K⊞, but instead of (RK⊞) one takes the
necessitation rule (from ϕ we infer ⊞ϕ), it is a trivial exercise to prove
that D⊞ is is sound and complete with respect to class of serial frames,
where sematic conditions for ⊞ stay as they are given on page 128.
In presenting a sound and complete Kripke semantics for the logic
K⊞, we have thus presented a Kripke semantics for the logics D2. This is
indeed different from the standard way of using a non-normal semantics
for characterising regular logics, as indeed takes place for the case of D2
and E2. Let us recall, for example, that models for D2 (resp. E2) are
standardly defined in terms of structures of the form N = 〈W,N,R, V 〉,
where W is a non-empty set (of worlds), N ⊆ W (the elements of N are
called normal worlds), R is a serial (resp. reflexive) relation on W , and
V a is valuation, which interprets Boolean formulas as usual and , ♦
as follows:
N , x |= ϕ iff both x ∈ N and
for every y ∈ W such that xRy, N , y |= ϕ,
N , x |= ♦ϕ iff either x /∈ N or
for some y ∈ W such that xRy, N , y |= ϕ.
It is well-known that D2 (resp. E2) is sound and complete with re-
spect to serial (resp. reflexive) models. To provide non-standard se-
mantic conditions applied to normal Kripke frames, for E2 and other
strictly regular modal logics may thus constitute an interesting task,
which would highlight interesting peculiarities of the specific canonical
model of a given strictly regular modal logic.
3. Concluding remarks
As for the interpretation of the ⊞-operator, however, the matter is a
bit more complicated. We saw that the logic K⊞ expresses the same
modal principles as Lemmon’s system D2, where  is interpreted as “it
is obligatory that”. Indeed in these systems are expressed some funda-
mental aspects of deontic logics (see, e.g., Chellas, 1980). As regards
the failure of the necessitation rule, even though Lemmon argues that it
is a desirable aspect of this logical system, this seems to go against the
current state of deontic logics, where it is usually accepted that every
tautology should be obligatory.
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We leave the problem of the right interpretation of the ⊞-operator
open. We just remark that if any can be found, this should be in a
context where axiom (D⊞) plays a fundamental conceptual role and where
the lack of necessitation does not cause harm to a faithful interpretation.
We now go back to the non-normal character of ⊞. Non-normality
is usually defined as the failure of some axiom or rule of the modal logic
K. But the results of the present paper suggests that there might be
more to it than that. Indeed, the non-normal modality ⊞ is as expres-
sive as the normal operator , since we can offer a definition of the
latter in terms of the former in the class of all frames. It seems that
also semantic components should play a role in the definition of non-
normality. Indeed, it is the semantic definition of ⊞ which is responsible
both for the failure of necessitation in the class of all frames and of the
impossibility to distinguish between  and ⊞ in serial frames, as shown
in Proposition 1.1. We leave to another occasion an attempt to offer a
definition of non-normality able to take into account both syntactic and
semantic aspects.
A second interesting aspect worth commenting on is the relationship
between the couples of operators {◦,⊡} and {∆,⊞}. Although both ⊡
and ⊞ internalize, within their syntax, semantic properties of the stan-
dard modal operator (indeed ϕ ≡KT ⊡ϕ and ϕ ≡KD ⊞ϕ), they do it
in slightly different ways. To see this remember that the ⊡-operator is
insensitive to reflexivity. This means that adding or removing reflexive
arrows does not change the validity of ⊡-formulas in a given frame. On
the contrary, as already noted, the ⊞-operator is very sensitive to the
presence or the absence of serial frames. A possible explanation for this
phenomenon is the interdefinability of ◦ and ⊡, where this phenomenon
is absent in the case of ∆ and ⊞. Indeed, ◦ and ∆ are insensitive with
respect to reflexivity (Gilbert and Venturi, 2016) and seriality (Hum-
berstone, 1995), respectively. Therefore, one might speculate that the
insensitivity property of ⊡ is just a property derived from the ◦-operator.
A last word on the possibility of using the ⊞-operator for the study of
the ∆-operator. Although these two operators are not in general interde-
finable, they are when we restrict them to reflexive frames. Indeed, it is
easy to check that ∆ϕ∧ϕ ≡KT ϕ ≡KT ⊞ϕ, but also ∆ϕ ≡KT ⊞ϕ∨⊞¬ϕ
(the latter being the case already in KD). We think that this observa-
tion raises the hope that the trivial characterization results we have for
⊞ above KT can be used to shed light on the corresponding results for
the ∆-operation. We leave this task for future work.
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